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In everyday interaction, subtle manifestations of sexism often pass unacknowledged and
become internalised and thus perceived as “natural” conduct. The introduction of new
vocabularies for referring to previously unnamed sexist conduct would presumably
enable individuals to start problematising hitherto unchallengeable sexism. In this
paper, we investigate whether and how these vocabularies empower people to speak
out against sexism. We focus on the use of the term “mansplaining” which, although
coined over 10 years ago, remains controversial and contested. Using Conversation
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Analysis and Membership Categorisation Analysis, this paper excavates the interaction-
al methods individuals use to formulate, in vivo, some prior spate of talk as mansplain-
ing. In doing so, speakers necessarily reformulate a co-participant’s social action to
highlight its sexist nature. Accusations of mansplaining are accomplished by invoking
gender (and other) categories and their associated rights to knowledge. In reconstruct-
ing another’s conduct as mansplaining, speakers display their understanding of what
mansplaining is (and could be) for the purpose at hand. Thus, the paper contributes to
the well-established body of interactional research on manifestations of sexism by
documenting how the normativity of epistemic rights is mobilised as a resource for
bringing off accusations of mansplaining.
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Sexist conduct ranges from overt, incontrovertible acts, for example using female
gender categories to construct insults (Weatherall, 2015), to covert and subtle
forms, such as women being explained to (Komarovsky, 1973) or corrected by
men who have less expertise on the topics under discussion (Bates, 2016). Calling
out subtle sexism is difficult not only because of the obscurity that subtle sexism
can have, but also because, being ingrained in the fabric of everyday life, it
becomes internalised and thus perceived as “natural” conduct (Chowdhury &
Gibson, 2019).
One solution has been to transform these “unspeakable” acts into “talk-ables”
through the development of new labels for everyday sexist conduct (Calder-Dawe,
2015). In theory, neologisms such as “mansplaining”, “bropropriating”, or
“manterrupting” should enable women to speak out against subtle gender inequal-
ities by exposing, problematising, and challenging sexist conduct (Bridges, 2017).
However, while these new “vocabularies of everyday sexism” are quickly adopted
by feminists, they can also spark arguments, defensive responses, and even coun-
teraccusations of sexism (Jane, 2017). With this range of possible responses avail-
able to those accused of sexism, we ask whether and how new vocabularies of
everyday sexism bring forth gender equality, in practice.
To answer this question, we use Conversation Analysis (henceforth CA) and
Membership Categorisation Analysis (henceforth MCA) to examine naturally
occurring accusations of mansplaining in talk-in-interaction. We chose to focus
on mansplaining because the term enjoyed a growing popularity over the last few
years. It has sparked countless debates across media channels about whether a
particular action was or was not mansplaining (Bates, 2016; Bridges, 2017). Yet, to
date, there is no agreed definition or scientific account of what constitutes man-
splaining. As methods developed to scrutinise social actions and categories in
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interaction, CA and MCA are uniquely equipped to study sexism-in-conversation
(Whitehead & Stokoe, 2015) and to lay out how gender and knowledge categories
are mobilised within accusations of “mansplaining”.
To date, only a few studies have examined spontaneous accusations of sexism-
in-interaction (Romaniuk, 2015; Speer, 2002; Weatherall, 2015), but none focused
on the more subtle forms of sexism such as mansplaining. By scrutinising the
moment-by-moment unfolding of accusations, we provide comprehensive empiri-
cal documentation of how accusations of “mansplaining” are constructed, how
they are dealt with, and how they shape the trajectory of the interactions in which
they occur.
We start with a brief review of conversation analytic research on language and
gender; thereafter, we introduce mansplaining and discuss the controversies
around the term with reference to a CA/MCA understanding of gender and knowl-
edge rights.
Gender and language
Gendered speech differences have been a long-standing concern pioneered by
Lakoff (1975). A vast body of literature has been dedicated to comparing
women’s and men’s speech (see Weatherall (2002) for a review), and how sex/
gender correlates with linguistic variables (e.g. tag questions, politeness, topic,
directives, etc.). Moving on from the study of sex differences in language use,
Kitzinger (1994, p. 501) asks not “how are women and men different/the same?”
but “why and how are women oppressed and how can we change that?”. The latter
question had been tackled by conversation analysts by undertaking “politically-
engaged research and social critique” (Wilkinson & Kitzinger, 2008, p. 568) on
issues related to gender, power and language (e.g. Sorrentino et al., 2018; Stokoe,
2003).
An early area of CA feminist research has investigated how women and men
dispute the conversational floor. Conversation Analysis conceptualises battles for
the floor by participants’ orientations (Edelsky, 1981) with rights to speak being
locally managed (Sacks et al., 1974). Early linguistic research examining gendered
conversational overlaps suggested that women’s contributions in professional set-
tings are often ignored and go unrecognised (Tannen, 1994). Similarly, in everyday
conversations, DeFrancisco (1991) found that men tend to silence women by dis-
attending the topics they initiate and by talking to them in a patronising way.
A landmark conversation analytic paper by Zimmerman and West (1975) argued
that men tend to interrupt women, which the authors characterise as a display of
dominance.
However, Kitzinger (2007) challenged this conclusion by unequivocally demon-
strating that the majority of overlapping talk is not interruptive and that, when
men do interrupt women – what conversation analysts call “interjacent overlap”
(Jefferson, 1986) – they often act cooperatively rather than competitively.
Importantly, Weatherall and Edmonds (2018) highlight that, when explicitly
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formulated, “interruptive” talk is tied to participants’ local institutional identities
and their associated deontic rights and responsibilities. This suggests that, for
example, a male TV show host would seem entitled to interrupt a female guest
in his role as host, but that his interruption would be considered transgressive if it
was tied to his gendered membership category. Accusing somebody of mansplain-
ing potentially constitutes one resource that women have available to frame inter-
ruptive talk as a gender-based transgression. Interruptions, however, are not the
only transgressions ostensibly encompassed by mansplaining, as we show next.
Making accusations of mansplaining
The term “mansplaining” entered the English vocabulary over 10 years ago. It
originated from a short autobiographical essay by feminist writer Rebecca Solnit
(2008), entitled “Men explain things to me (Facts didn’t get in their way)”. In the
essay, Solnit recounts an interaction she and her friend had with a man who kept
telling her about an important book he discovered but had not actually read.
Meanwhile, her friend tried to intervene to inform him that Solnit was the
author of that book. This scenario, in which a man seems to assume that he
knows more about a topic than the woman with whom he is interacting when,
in fact, it is the other way around, resonated with countless women who had had
similar experiences. While the story does not feature the term “mansplaining”, the
situation described by Solnit generated a surge in awareness of this behaviour, with
countless threads on social media, blog posts, and newspaper articles debating
mansplaining in the last 10 years.
Even though there is widespread agreement that mansplaining recurs frequently
(Bates, 2016), no consensus has been reached about what actually constitutes
“mansplaining” behaviour. “Mansplaining” has been defined as the act of explain-
ing something to someone in a patronising and condescending manner (Reagle,
2016). Many definitions also highlight that it is usually a man who mansplains
something to a woman. Some sources specify that the woman is assumed to be less
knowledgeable about the topic and less capable of understanding than the
“explainer” (Jashik, 2012), when in fact she has more knowledge or expertise in
that particular topic (Reagle, 2016). Nonetheless, Solnit (2012, para. 3) urges that
“mansplaining is not a universal flaw of the gender, just the intersection between
overconfidence and cluelessness where some portion of that gender gets stuck”.
Finally, mansplainers are said to usurp the floor and restrict interlocutors’ oppor-
tunities to contribute to the conversation (Wilhelm, 2017).
Most definitions tie mansplaining to interlocutors’ gender identities and their
knowledge/expertise about the topic of the conversation. Drawing on CA and
MCA concepts, we unpack how these notions, together with shared conversational
norms, are mobilised in constituting mansplaining into a transgressive act (Drew,
1998). Extensive conversation analytic research has demonstrated that epistemics
(a domain under which knowledge rights are subsumed) plays a constitutive role in
the organisation of conversations (Heritage, 2012). One aspect of the
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complainability of mansplaining resides in it being formulated as infringing con-
versational norms related to the epistemic ordering of the conversation – specifi-
cally, what conversation analysts call “epistemic primacy” (Stivers et al., 2011),
namely who has the right to provide information to whom. In naturally occurring
conversations, interlocutors are responsible and hold each other accountable for
taking into consideration their relative epistemic status regarding the topic under
discussion; that is, their respective rights to knowledge about the topic (Heritage,
2012) as the basis for performing knowledge-oriented actions such as
informing, explaining, or asserting. For instance, people avoid delivering news
that others may have already heard (Terasaki, 2004) and manage the delicate
implications of knowing more than their interlocutors when giving advice (Shaw
& Hepburn, 2013).
A person’s epistemic status is grounded in their access to the domain of knowl-
edge under discussion (Heritage & Raymond, 2005). In Solnit’s story, as she had
written the book, she is presumed to have more knowledge about it than her
interlocutor, who had not even read it. Category-based entitlement is another
basis for claiming epistemic and moral rights/authority to display one’s knowl-
edge (e.g. by providing an explanation or making a recommendation) in conver-
sation (Potter, 1996). As the author of the book, Solnit was more entitled than
her interlocutor to comment on its content. Note that both methods of holding
one accountable render the man’s conduct as transgressive by formulating it in
terms that highlight its blameworthiness. As conversational devices, formulations
“advance the prior report by finding a point in the prior utterance and thus
shifting its focus, redeveloping its gist, making something explicit that was
previously implicit in the prior utterance, or by making inferences about its
presuppositions or implications” (Heritage, 1985, p. 104). Accusations of man-
splaining formulate some prior conduct as sexism by pointing out how it per-
formed an ostensible violation of epistemic rights and linking it to participants’
gender categories.
How does gender come into play in accusations of mansplaining? As a trans-
portable identity (Zimmerman, 1998), gender is perpetually available as a resource
for speakers to make relevant at any moment in the conversation (Stokoe, 2003).
In our analysis, we suggest that “mansplaining” works as a membership catego-
risation device (Sacks, 1989), making not only the interlocutor’s categorial identity
(man) relevant, but at the same time placing the accuser in the paired membership
category “woman”. This results in highlighting a patriarchal organisation of
gender, with women presumed to be inferior – here having less knowledge/exper-
tise – than men. As such, our analysis will show that accusations of mansplaining,
unlike accusations of being patronising or condescending, allow speakers to index
aspects of gender relations that compound the transgressor’s culpability. Not only
are they guilty of wrongly claiming more/better knowledge, but they are also evi-
dently sexist in presuming to be more knowledgeable than their women interloc-
utors and therefore treating them as clueless or ignorant.
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Data and method
The data for this project are naturally occurring interactions, all in varieties of
English, in which a participant accuses another of “mansplaining”. We used an
internet search engine to identify recordings of real-life interactions featuring var-
ious forms of the lexeme “mansplain”. Most of the clips were found on social
media platforms (see Table 1) even though they originally aired on television.
For inclusion in our data corpus, we selected all clips that (1) retained the sequen-
tial and temporal properties of the interactions they depicted and (2) featured
non-scripted talk. As a result, we discarded clips from films or TV series. These
inclusion criteria ensured that the data we collected allowed us to examine natu-
rally occurring uses of “mansplaining” in their original interactional environments.
Applying these inclusion criteria to our search results yielded 18 clips and seven
hours of interactional data. In 16 of these cases, which we investigate in this paper,
speakers employ the target term within accusations leveraged against a co-present
party. The remaining two cases feature speakers apologising for their own or others’
conduct. The extracts originate from a range of institutional settings (see Table 2)
and feature participants involved in conversational activities such as debates, or
news interviews while also orienting to an overhearing audience (Heritage, 1985).
The clips can be accessed via the URLs available in the online supplemental mate-
rial. The project received ethical approval from York St John University Research
Ethics Committee and abides by the British Psychological Society’s guidelines for
human research (2014) ethics and for internet-mediated research (2017).
Table 1 Data sources.
Source Count
Social media platform (e.g. YouTube, Twitter) 13
Catch up TV service (e.g. Box of Brodcasts) 2
News platform (e.g. Mediaite) 2
Blog (Barstool) 1
Total 18





Parliament question time 2
Morning show 1
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We transcribed the data using the Jeffersonian system developed for CA which
captured the fine details (e.g. prosody, tempo, volume) of speech production
(Hepburn & Bolden, 2017). To analyse the data, we used a combination of
Conversation Analysis (Sidnell & Stivers, 2013) and Membership Categorisation
Analysis (Hester & Eglin, 1997), both introduced by Sacks (1992a, 1992b). We
used these methods to examine the sequential environment of “mansplaining”
whilst paying attention to how interlocutors’ identities and categorisation practices
become relevant in and through accusations of mansplaining. Specifically, these
approaches allowed us to observe how and what conduct is sanctioned by accusing
someone of mansplaining, and how interlocutors’ reasoning practices are organ-
ised with respect to their shared social knowledge, in other words, how they pro-
duce “culture-in-action” (Housley & Fitzgerald, 2015, p. 4–5). The selected
extracts shown in this paper span the range of recurring practices we found
across our data collection.
Analysis
The extracts below illustrate three ways in which accusations of mansplaining are
accomplished. We start with cases in which mansplaining exposes what partici-
pants locally problematise as patronising and condescending conduct. Next, we
turn to accusations of mansplaining that challenge a man’s relative rights to claim
authority over gendered knowledge, such as knowledge of women’s reproductive
health. Finally, we observe how accusations of mansplaining are deployed in a
dispute over who has epistemic authority over a specific domain of knowledge.
Across several of these examples we show how speakers’ formulations of inter-
locutors’ conduct, which trade on, and produce, their relative epistemic rights,
occur in conjunction with a battle for the floor.
Exposing a man’s patronising conduct
Extract 1 is taken from an episode of an internet sports show called “Barstool
rundown”, which is based in the United States. The episode features three hosts –
Dave (DP), Kevin (KC), and Dan (DK) – and five guests – Liz (LG), Frankie
(FB), Jared (JD), Eric (EH), and Tommy (TS) (see Figure 1). The participants1 are
reviewing a recent baseball game between the Red Sox and Yankees, won by the
former. Before line 01, the participants have been disapprovingly discussing Liz’s
reaction to the loss, specifically a clip she recorded after the game, in which she
reaffirms her devotion to the Yankees by stating she would rather be a loser than
become a Red Sox fan. We are interested in Liz’s accusation of mansplaining in
line 12 (highlighted in grey in the transcript) directed at Frankie, who is also a
devoted Yankees supporter.
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In the transcript, we use initials to identify the speakers – as listed above –
plus the film crew (C). For clarity, in the analysis we refer to speakers by their
first names.
Extract 1 MNSP-09 “Are you mansplaining” [17:16-18:17]
01 FB: ^Fig. 1 <I mean like [no one’s sayin’ we- like¼
02 C: [((laughter))
03 FB: ¼whe- when your [ team ] loses you don’t be like¼
04 EH: [nope]
05 FB: ¼#I wanna become a Red >Sox fan<. We’re just saying
06 like THEY’re in a better spot than us Do you get that?
07 (0.6)
08 LG: "Oh i- .Hh (0.2) Do I get ["that?]
09 ?: [Uh ] [#o:h
10 FB: [>like<¼
11 C: ¼O:h no: [: : : ,¼aw: : : : :] ¼
12 LG: [Are you mansplaining that we just]=
13 C: ¼[( (very loud voices))
14 LG: ¼[( [ )
15 FB: [THAT’S NOT MANSPLAINING. NO.
16 [THAT’S NOT ‘SPLAINING.¼
17 KC: [Uhr:: : : : ((shakes fists in the air))
18 FB: ¼((pounds hand on the back of DK’s chair))
19 [THAT’S NOT MANSPLAINING THAT’S NOT MANSPLAINING]
20 LG: [(you mean there’s not [ another game ( ) ]
21 KC: [ROUGH N’ ROWDY SIX. ROUGH]
22 N’ROWDY SIX. ((bangs fists on the desk))
23 DP: That’s mansplaining ((shakes finger and looks at FB))
24 FB: NO IT’S NOT. THAT’S NOT MANSPLAINING
25 DP: That’s [mansplaining
26 LG: [YOU MEAN THERE’S NOT ANOTHER GAME THE SEASON’S
27 ["O::VER? ((gasp))
28 DP: [That’s mansplaining Tha[t’s mansplaining
29 FB: [NO I meant like-
((28 lines omitted))
57 DK: You man[splained YOU MANSPLAINED
58 LG: [I I ()
59 KC: [I I I honestly I think I-
60 FB: I’m not like teach her how baseball wor[ks.
61 DK: [O:h you
62 di: d. You did. You mansplained.
With so much going on in the extract, we will start by tracing how the con-
versation unfolds before presenting our analysis. The extract starts with
8 Feminism & Psychology 0(0)
Frankie’s criticism of Liz’s display of support for the Yankees, whereby he
implies that it is at odds with the reaction of other Yankees fans – which he
refers to via the collective pronoun “we” (line 06), thereby excluding Liz from
this category. He ends his turn with a latched understanding check “Do you get
that?” (line 06), prompting an ironic counter from Liz “Do I get "that?” (line
08), followed by response cries from another participant (line 09) and the film
crew (line 11) and, eventually, by Liz’s accusation of mansplaining (lines 12 and
14). Frankie immediately shouts a repeated denial (lines 15–16) and continues
denying the accusation (lines 19 and 24), in response to Dave’s contention (line
24). Kevin produces a response cry, gets up to shake his fists triumphantly, and
shouts the name of boxing-brawling event “Rough n’ Rowdy Six” (lines 17, 21–
2). Dave then further insists on Frankie’s mansplaining (lines 28–9 and 33).
Meanwhile, Liz continues talking but the shouting renders her turn unintelli-
gible (line 22). She takes the floor again at line 26, where she rhetorically asks
Frankie to confirm that the baseball season was over. Skipping 28 lines in
which they return to discussing Liz’s message, we rejoin the participants in
line 57 where Dave has not budged from characterising Frankie’s conduct
towards Liz as mansplaining. In this fragment, Frankie explicitly disavows
attempting to teach Liz about baseball (line 60), which attracts Dave’s
prompt disagreement “O:h you di:d.” (lines 61–2).
Let us now focus on Liz’s accusation of mansplaining. Frankie’s turn in line 06
concludes with an understanding check which is followed by 0.6 seconds of silence,
Figure 1. Configuration of panellists before the accusation2.
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forecasting trouble. Liz’s oh-prefaced response in line 08 “Oh i- Hh (0.2) Do I get
that?” points to the inapposite and condescending nature of the question
(Heritage, 1998). The full repeat of the question locates the trouble source as the
questioning action (Robinson & Kevoe-Feldman, 2010); that is, Frankie should
not have questioned Liz’s understanding as she has equal status as a sports enthu-
siast and guest on the show.
At this point the other panellists begin attending to Liz’s handling of Frankie’s
question with response cries in lines 09 and 11. Frankie, however, treats Liz’s turn
in line 08 as a genuine repair initiation and projects a redoing of some prior turn
“>like<”. Before he is able to redo his turn, Liz levies an accusation of mansplain-
ing against him. The accusation makes Frankie’s and, by implication, Liz’s gender
category relevant. While Frankie and Liz are co-members in the category
“Yankees fans” and thus, presumably, have comparable knowledge of baseball,
Frankie’s display of superior knowledge – via the understanding check – is tied,
through the accusation of mansplaining, to his gender category. Retrospectively,
the accusation renders Frankie’s conduct not only patronising but also sexist, on
the basis that he has treated Liz as less knowledgeable than him about baseball
because she is a woman.
The vehicle for this accusation, a rhetorical question, is in fact “unanswerable”
(Heinemann, 2008). If Frankie answers “yes” he admits to having committed a
sexist act; if he answers “no”, he denies that he has been explaining baseball to Liz,
which he accountably has been doing. Frankie’s defence is a transformative answer
(Stivers & Hayashi, 2010) that refutes the labelling of the action as “mansplaining”
“THAT’S NOT MANSPLAINING. NO. THAT’S NOT ‘SPLAINING.” (lines
15–16). This defence strategy illuminates the stigmatised connotation of the term.
Frankie’s emphatic and repeated denials further underscore the stigmatised con-
notations of ‘mansplaining’ as an ascription of sexist and thus morally sanction-
able conduct. Two other moments in the interaction illuminate that and how the
issue at stake here is Frankie’s treatment of Liz as less knowledgeable than himself
about baseball. First, there is Liz’s ironic understanding check in lines 27–8 “YOU
MEAN THERE’S NOT ANOTHER GAME THE SEASON’S "O::VER?”,
whereby she solicits confirmation from Frankie on an issue to which she clearly
knows the answer. Second, in line 60, Frankie produces a disavowal of the ongoing
portrayal of his behaviour as trying to “teach her how baseball works”. Taken
together, these reformulations illuminate participants’ orientation to what consti-
tutes mansplaining, for all practical purposes, namely Frankie (a man) treating Liz
(a woman) as lacking basic knowledge about baseball even though she has been
showing equal competence and knowledge of the sport and, like Frankie, is a long-
time fan of the Yankees.
A further accusation of mansplaining which exposes patronising conduct is
featured in Extract 2 from Tucker Carlson Tonight, a TV show in the United
States. Here the conservative political commentator, Tucker Carlson (TC), and
his guest, Monica Klein (MK)3, a political strategist, disagree about Susan
Collins’s character – a Republican senator who supported Brett Kavanaugh’s
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nomination to the US Supreme Court of the United States, despite sexual assault
allegations against him.
Extract 2 MNSP-2 “saying something that’s obviously true” [04:06-04:25]
01 MK: [An’ I think she will be vo:ted out]
02 TC: [I think th’t your world view is s ]cary,¼
03 MK: ¼because women are extremely frustrated with
04 Susan "Collins right now because she’s
05 [supported a SEXUAL predator.]
06 TC: [Well not every woman feels th]at way,¼And
07 [you don’t speak for all women j]ust so you know.
08 MK: ["OKAY but there is a thirty ]
09 (.)
10 #Oka[y thank ] you for [mansp] laining that t(h)o me.
11 TC: [Mo#nica] [okay]
12 (0.6)
13 TC: £hhum£ I’m not mansplaining, (0.4) I’m saying something
14 that’s obviously true.
15 MK: [There is a thirty per ]cent gap
16 TC: [I appreciate you coming on. Thanks.]
The extract starts at a point where the disagreement between the interlocutors is
escalating. In fact, in lines 01–02, we see Monica and Tucker overlapping, with
neither dropping out. Managing to secure the floor, Monica follows her prediction
of Collins’s electoral defeat with an account for this, namely that women will no
longer support the Republican senator as a reaction to her support for
Kavanaugh. In interjacent overlap, Tucker counters Monica’s point “Well not
every woman feels that way” (line 06). He then implies Monica has portrayed
herself as a spokesperson for all women, a position which he challenges via an
ostensible informing “And you don’t speak for all women just so you know” (lines
06–07). Note in particular the turn final knowledge marker that, similarly, to
Frankie’s understanding check in Extract 1, treats the interlocutor as oblivious
to what the speaker has said.
Monica responds in line 10 by non-seriously thanking Tucker for mansplaining
“#Okay thank you for mansplaining that t(h)o me”. Note the aspiration particle
that adds a mocking undertone and implies Monica finds Tucker’s informing
ridiculous (Demasi & Tileaga, 2019). The accusation of mansplaining exposes
Tucker’s conduct as patronising. That is, Monica calls out Tucker for treating
her as though she does not understand that she does not speak for all women;
moreover, it neatly addresses the irony that Tucker has claimed authority to
speak on behalf of women. Tucker denies the accusation of mansplaining by
resisting the nominated action as a gendered category-bound activity, thus ori-
enting to mansplaining as a stigmatised action label. He produces a competing
formulation of his conduct as “saying something that’s obviously true”, by which
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he substitutes the accused mansplaining as something known-in-common
(Wowk, 1984).
To summarise, Extracts 1 and 2 feature accusations of mansplaining leveraged
at men who treated their women interlocutors as ignorant or less knowledgeable
than them about matters on which the women’s (equal) knowledge is unquestion-
able. These examples resonate with the mainstream vernacular understanding of
mansplaining as condescending or patronising behaviour. Next we turn to accu-
sations of mansplaining that build on women’s superior epistemic rights to matters
related to reproductive healthcare.
Challenging a man’s epistemic authority over gendered knowledge
Extract 3 comes from another TV show in the United States. This extract is taken
from an episode of MSNBC’s news show that also discusses Brett Kavanaugh’s
appointment to the US Supreme Court. Before line 1, the panellists, Zerlina
Maxwell (ZM), Noah Rothman (NR), and Danielle Moodie-Mills (DM)4, had
been debating Kavanaugh’s judicial philosophy (“he” in line 1) and its impact on
key points of contention between the Democrats and Republicans such as healthcare
Figure 2a. Zerlina raises her right hand to tap Noah’s forearm5.
Figure 2b. Zerlina retracts her hand.
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and abortion legislation. The video stills (Figures 2a–2c) following the transcript
track Zerlina’s right-hand movements as she battles for the floor with Noah.
Extract 3 MNSP-01 “You’re headed right towards mansplaining” [01:16-01:41]
01 NR: bec’use he has a cen[trist¼
02 ZM: [Fine
03 NR: ¼philosophy and conservatives were
04 [very disinterested ]
05 DM: [Are w"e- are you ki"dd]ing¼
06 NR: ¼I’m jus’ [allo-]
07 DM: [No y]ou hea::"rd him. You
08 h[eard him. He does not have a >middle<]
09 NR: [I am trying to explain to you what ]
10 >the conservati[ve< philosophy is ]
11 ZM: [Do:n- don’t ^Fig. 2a do >y¼do<] that.
13 (0.2)
14 NR: [and the nertio-
15 ZM: [You’re- you’re headed ^Fig. 2b right towards
16 mansplaining.=You don- don’t say I’m trying to>explain
17 something,<.h to a woma:n when it had to do
18 with #reproductive healthcare.=
19 NR: ¼#a [I’ m- I’m-]
20 ZM: [^Fig. 2c >Don’t ever] do that<¼
21 NR: ¼because [we are tryin’ we’re- n- ] no¼
22 ZM: [>That’s not a good idea<]
23 NR: ¼[the notion] we are [presenting h]ere is
24 RL: [So: let’s-]
25 ZM: [th’s not a good idea]
26 NR: that this is [thee. foreground of aye ] ¼
27 RL: [ Well let’s go down the row of this ]
28 NR: ¼murderous Nazi regi:me
Prior to line 01, Noah, a Republican, has argued that Brett Kavanaugh, due to
his judicial philosophy, would not necessarily favour the Republican agenda on
restricting access to abortions. In line 05, Danielle erupts with the challenge “Are
w"e- are you ki"dding” (upward arrows indicate high pitch), starting her turn in
interjacent overlap, that is, while Noah was in the midst of presenting the conser-
vative standpoint on abortion. She continues by strongly contesting Kavanaugh’s
portrayal as a centrist. Next, Noah avoids directly engaging with Danielle’s con-
testation and instead attempts to resume his point about the conservative stand-
point: “I am trying to explain to you what >the conservative< philosophy is”
(lines 09–10). In formulating his ongoing action as “trying to explain”, Noah
not only positions himself as more knowledgeable than his interlocutor,
Danielle, but also implies that her challenge shows she has failed to grasp his
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prior point. It is this turn that occasions Zerlina’s accusation of mansplaining
which we unpack below.
Zerlina’s intervention stretches across several turns at talk, each responding to
Noah’s turns. Starting in interjacent overlap in line 11, she admonishes Noah “Do:
n- don’t do >y¼do< that.” while also raising her right hand to tap his forearm
(Figure 2a) which results in Noah momentarily pausing his turn (line 13). As he
resumes talking (line 14), Zerlina produces the accusation of mansplaining in com-
petition with Noah, who abandons his turn. At that point, having secured the
floor, Zerlina retracts her hand (Figure 2b). She warns Noah that he is “heading”
towards mansplaining, on the basis of his formulation of his own conduct as
“trying to explain” something to Danielle. Latched to this warning is her own
formulation of Noah’s action now portrayed as a sexist act: he was going to
“>explain something,< .h to a woma:n” regarding “#reproductive healthcare”
(lines 16–18).
Noah’s attempt to respond (lines 19, 21, and 23) is littered with self-repairs and
cut-offs employed to deal with Zerlina coming in again in interjacent overlap
(Schegloff, 2000) with further admonishments (lines 20, 22, and 25) in a second
attempt to prevent Noah from speaking (see Figure 2c). Despite Noah’s frag-
mented turn, we can surmise he is not engaging with Zerlina’s accusation directly
and, instead, opts to continue his presentation of the conservative ideology “the
notion we are presenting here” (line 23). Noah’s ignorance of the accusation is
similar to what we saw with Frankie’s response in Extract 1 – not responding (e.g.
with a denial or apology) therefore does not acknowledge that “mansplaining” has
occurred, or indeed is even a real phenomenon.
Let us now unpack how Zerlina constructs Noah’s action as a gendered trans-
gression. First, by using the term “mansplaining” she makes Noah’s gender rele-
vant as opposed to, say, his political identity, thus tying his ostensible sexism to his
incumbency in a gender membership category. Second, she formulates the topic of
the conversation as “reproductive healthcare”, not conservative ideology. Topic
formulation is crucial here for the accusation of mansplaining to be effective, as
reproductive healthcare constitutes a domain of knowledge over which a woman
Figure 2c. Zerlina raises her hand in front of Noah.
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would have more epistemic authority than a man, whereas Noah, as a Republican,
would be well within his rights to claim epistemic authority over conservative
ideology. Third, she makes Danielle’s gender relevant, by referring to her as “a
woman”. In doing that, Noah’s gender identity also becomes salient. As a man, he
should not have claimed to have more knowledge about reproductive healthcare
than Danielle, who, as a woman, has epistemic authority over this domain.
Another accusation of mansplaining that is built on category entitlement to
gendered knowledge about human reproduction is illustrated in Extract 4. It
comes from a discussion, in the Houses of the Oireachtas – Ireland’s national
parliament – of a new Health Bill which would legalise abortion following a
referendum held in May 2018. Among the amendments to the bill is one put
forward by Peadar Toibın (PT), proposing that women are provided with infor-
mation about abortion before they can access pregnancy terminations. This
proposal occasions Kate O’Connell (KO)’s6 accusation of mansplaining (lines
06–07).
Extract 4 MNSP-16 “Mansplain it in person” [00:00-00:20]
01 PT: The informa- pre- pre- (0.7) pre- pre- pre- pre-
02 presents the information (.) in a way that is
03 easily consumable by people, in a digital format(h)
04 you can put it on (.) a:: a memory stick or uh uh
05 [etcetera (.) The POINT the th-]
06 KO: [omansplain ito in PERSON you could]
07 MANsplain it in person [perhaps. ]
08 Ch: [( ) deputy] ( ) O’Connell you’re
09 [[ [( )]
10 KO: [TIp around] everyon[e’s house and have a cha:t]
11 PT: [I’m tal- I’m talking to the]
12 [minister here (.) deputy] O’Connell
13 Ch: [>Deputy O’Connell< Please]
As part of his proposed amendment to the Health Bill, in lines 01–05, Peadar
suggests that abortion information could be digitally distributed for easy access.
Kate’s intervention (line 06), in interjacent overlap, is timed to be heard as a non-
serious alternative suggestion: instead of distributing the information via memory
sticks, Peadar could “mansplain it in PERSON”. Here the use of “mansplaining”
suggests that distributing information about abortion wrongly assumes that the
population (of women) is unknowledgeable. Also, the government, through the
amendment introduced by Peadar, illegitimately claims both more knowledge than
the population and the right to intrude into citizens’ private sphere. Kate’s com-
ment and its continuation in line 10 (“TIp around everyone’s house and have a
cha:t”) ridicules Peadar as the promoter of the amendment and further builds the
exaggerated non-real depiction of the information campaign.
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Similar to Zerlina in Extract 3, Kate formulates mansplaining as a prospective
transgression, predicated on Peader’s current actions. At that time, Peader was
engaged in explaining and tabling amendments, which are activities fitted to his
identity as a committee member. But the bill he was proposing would eventually
lead to women having to receive information they did not seek from a source that
claims epistemic authority over their reproductive health.
Peadar’s gender is left implicit, but as in the previous extract, “mansplaining”
treats Peadar as morally culpable by making his gender relevant and tying it to his
claims to epistemic primacy over women’s reproductive rights. Indeed, Peadar
responds with a meta-comment that acknowledges institutional norms: “I’m tal-
I’m talking to the minister here (.) deputy O’Connell” (lines 11–12), sidestepping
the accusation by returning to institutional business. However, the accusation is
unable to be withdrawn once on the record and Peadar’s sidestepping did not
prevent the media from reporting his “mansplaining”.
To summarise, Extracts 3 and 4 show how, through accusations of mansplain-
ing, women sanction men for claiming epistemic authority over women’s repro-
ductive healthcare, a domain of knowledge to which women have primary rights.
The turns housing the accusations are launched in interjacent overlap and they end
up derailing the accused’s turn. By contrast, in the following two extracts, the
accusations are grounded in the accusers’ (women’s) primary access to the domains
of knowledge that underpin the debated topics.
Disputing relative epistemic authority on the basis of primary access to
knowledge
We move to a debate in the British Parliament, where Extract 5 comes from. It
features Andrea Leadsom (AL), a Conservative MP and Leader of the UK House
of Commons, rebutting Chris Leslie’s (CL)7, then a Labour MP. In his question
starting at line 1, Chris highlights the likelihood that the Prime Minister (Theresa
May) will lose the upcoming vote (on 15 January 2019) for her Brexit deal, and
that, as Leader of the House, Andrea ought to allow time for debate of the possible
options following that defeat.
Extract 5 MNSP-15 “Mansplaining my job to me” [00:20-01:25]
01 CL: PERHAPS THE LEADER OF THE HOUSE (0.4) perhaps
02 the leader of the house though (.) can answer
03 that question and confi::rm .h that she’s keeping
04 that space free on Monday the <twenty-first of January>
05 .h for after the Prime Minister’s uh proposals have
06 been defea:ted so that the (.) House will come forward
07 .h and be able to debate what comes next,¼She wouldn’t
08 (0.2) <House¼albeit .h that she’s a bit sore at having
10 (.) lost on that particular >point,<¼ And finally could
11 she confirm .h (0.6) excellently that SHE will also be
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12 publishing (0.3) the advice that her OFFICIALS are giving
13 her about #Monday the twenty-first of >January< since she
14 was entreating the House and the Speaker to publish all
15 the advice that is given to him.
16 (1.4)
17 Ch: >The Leader< of the House?
18 (1.2)
19 AL: W’ll I’m slightly disappointed at the Honourable
20 Gentleman for (0.2) helpfully MANsplaining my job to
21 m[e, I am perfectly able (0.3) to carry out]¼
22 Au: [ (( l a u g h t e r) ) ]
23 AL: ¼[MY job, .h and]¼
24 CL: [((inaudible)) (sure) ((nodding))]
25 AL: ¼I have [ALREA:DY: answered the question] as put ¼
26 CL: [ ((purses lips)) ]
27 AL: ¼[by the Honourable Gentleman,] .h that the Prime¼
28 CL: [((inaudible)) ( ) ]
29 AL: ¼Minister will of cou:rse abide by the terms of
30 the Grieve Amendment.
Andrea, as the Leader of the House, is responsible for organising the debate
schedule and thus has epistemic authority over the schedule of events. Chris sug-
gests that she will not adequately perform her duties: “she wouldn’t (0.2) <want to
fail> (.) to comply” (lines 07–08). In this context, his tirade scores a point (see Bull
& Wells, 2012) against the government by (1) anticipating their probable loss, and
(2) highlighting possible deceitful tactics to prevent parliament debating options
following that loss. This directly questions Andrea’s suitability as Leader of the
House, by asking for confirmation that she will indeed carry out the expected and
lawful duties qua Leader of the House (as listed by Chris).
In rebutting Chris’s tirade, Andrea directly and ironically accuses him of
“helpfully MANsplaining my job to me” (lines 20–1). The use of mansplaining
here effectively accuses Chris of having claimed superior knowledge about the
Leader of the House’s responsibilities, which is Andrea’s position. Her turn
crafts an asymmetrical relationship between herself and Chris by holding him
morally culpable for his tirade: “I’m slightly disappointed” (line 21). In this con-
text, the ironic “helpfully” undermines the seriousness of Chris’s turn by treating it
as talk “which is motivated, distorted or erroneous in some way” (Potter, 1996,
p. 107). Indeed, this targets Chris’s category incumbency of “man” explaining her
job (and is thus accountable for that action), and not as her political rival question-
ing her capacity as Leader of the House (where he would not be accountable for that
action). “Mansplaining”, then, holds Chris accountable by characterising his turn as
transgressive, asserts Andrea’s epistemic authority, and also sequentially deletes
Chris’s turn by not answering his questions. Andrea concludes her accusation
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with an assertion “I am perfectly able (0.3) to carry out MY job” (lines 21–3) that
dismisses Chris’s insinuation that she would not fulfil her professional duties.
In Extract 5, the mansplaining accusation renders Chris’s conduct as sexist on
the basis of him claiming more knowledge about parliamentary procedures than
Andrea, the incumbent Leader of the House. In the final extract, we will see the
speaker using the same method for accomplishing an accusation of mansplaining
against a political adversary, but this time the label mischaracterises the accused’s
conduct, thus illustrating how the term “mansplaining” can be exploited by a
speaker to silence and discredit an opponent.
Extract 6, from the UK’s BBC ‘Politics Live’ show (host Jo Coburn – JC in the
transcript), features a debate on what the Withdrawal Agreement (the treaty con-
taining the terms of the UKs withdrawal from the European Union due to Brexit)
means for the UK. We see Claire Perry (CP) accusing her interlocutor, Barry
Gardiner (BG)8, of mansplaining (lines 14–16).
Extract 6 MNSP-12 “Stop the guy thing” [20:09-20:44]
01 JC: Well how meaningful is it then
02 [in in if you can’t go back and renegotiate? ]
03 CP: [Wel- wel- bu- bu- but can I "also jus’ say th’t]
04 this idea that they- that we haven’t been clear there
05 has been complete clarity from the Prime Minister who
06 has never said this was going to be easy,¼The Chequers
07 proposal which is eh-a th- the y’know the future trade
08 >relationship is only part of it< .hh "What Barry forgets
09 is what we’re actually negotiating now is the Withdrawal
10 Agreement whi[ch is- we- e-]
11 BG: [>No sorry that’s]< not true.
12 That’s not ^Fig. 3a true because what we’re actually
13 d[oing .hh they have they have to bring back to Parliament]
14 CP: [>Sorry<. "Please let me finish Barry, Sto-stop the guy]
15 thing of e-stop ^Fig. 3b
16 [mansplaining=I know what they’re doing]=
17 BG: [the the a- I’m not mansplain:ning ]
18 CP: ¼‘cause I go to [cabinet. ]
19 BG: [They ha-] they have to] [bring b(r)ack-]
20 ? : [hmuhhahum ]
21 hhha [ha
22 BG: [they have to br[ing back
23 CP: [I’ll let you keep going then
24 I’[ll tell you wh]at’s actually happe[nin’.
25 BG: [Okay. Thank you] [You said it was
26 only the Withdrawal Agreement [it i]s not, It is also¼
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27 CP: [No.]
28 BG: ¼the future parli- the future political framework
29 with the eE yuU.
The extract begins with Claire explaining an earlier point which has been ques-
tioned by the host. Her extended turn between lines 03–10 trades on her job as a
government minister to claim superior access to what the Withdrawal Agreement
means. Claire marks this with a correction to Barry’s understanding (“WHAt
Barry forgets is”, lines 08–09), and an implicit claim to epistemic authority
(“what we’re actually negotiating”, line 09). At a point of possible completion
Figure 3b. Claire touches Barry’s arm.
Figure 3a. Barry raises left index finger9.
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(though not the end of Claire’s turn), Barry disagrees (“No sorry that’s not true”,
line 11), and puts forward his competing version using an identical formulation
(“what we’re actually doing”, line 12 and Figure 3a) aimed to reject Claire’s char-
acterisation of the Withdrawal Agreement. In interjacent overlap (line 14) Claire
asks Barry to allow her to finish her point, implying she was interrupted. As Barry
does not relinquish his turn (note lines 13 and 14 are produced in sustained over-
lap), Claire produces the accusation of mansplaining. She invokes her access to the
UK Cabinet which ostensibly lends her superior knowledge of the content of the
Withdrawal Agreement. Barry replies to her accusation with a denial “I’m not
mansplain:ning” (line 17) and then continues his point – as in Extracts 1 and 2,
Barry’s response rejects the act as mansplaining but does not refute that he has
transgressed. Having failed to silence her interlocutor, Claire re-positions herself as
ostensibly allowing Barry to finish his turn “I’ll let you keep going” (line 23), but
announces she will provide a counter-version of his point, thus undermining
Barry’s credibility.
The direct accusation of mansplaining produced between lines 14–16: “st-stop
the guy thing of e- stop mansplaining” (see also Figure 3b) interrupts Barry’s turn,
invokes Claire’s epistemic authority, and casts future talk by Barry as potentially
inaccurate. Moreover, repairing “guy thing” to “mansplaining” dismisses Barry’s
talk on the basis that he is engaging in sexist behaviour, not only something that
“guys” do (Kitzinger & Mandelbaum, 2013), but a recognisable transgression.
In sum, Extracts 5 and 6 feature accusations of mansplaining brought off through
the invocation of the speaker’s direct access, and thus superior rights, to knowledge
that informs the topic under discussion. However, the close examination of the
sequential and interactional antecedents of these accusations reveals crucial differ-
ences between the two cases. While in Extract 5 the referent of mansplaining can be
traced back to Chris’s questions that challenged Andrea’s competence as Leader of
the House, in Extract 6, what Claire refers to as mansplaining is Barry’s disagree-
ment with her assertion. In fact, as we trace the aftermath of the accusation, we see it
used to silence Barry and ultimately undermine the credibility of his assertions.
Discussion
The present paper is the first to examine naturally occurring accusations of man-
splaining in talk-in-interaction, thus providing empirical insight into what consti-
tutes mansplaining. We found that women employ the term “mansplaining” to
characterise men’s conduct not only as simply patronising and condescending, but
as designed to assert the speaker’s superior knowledge, on the basis of their gender.
Furthermore, mansplaining is used to call out unfounded claims for epistemic
primacy over topics to which women, based on various category entitlements,
(ostensibly) have more rights or superior knowledge.
Our cases evince a “family resemblance” in that they are connected not by a single
common feature, but by a series of practices and resources that accusations of man-
splaining partially share. In the first analytic section, we showed how accusations of
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mansplaining locate the transgression in a man’s patronising and condescending
conduct. Specifically, the accusers implied that men treated their interlocutors as
ignorant or questioned their knowledge on issues where the women had clear exper-
tise. Next, we showed how accusations alleged that men claim to have more knowl-
edge than women on issues to do with reproductive healthcare. The last two extracts
featured accusations rooted in men’s claims of epistemic authority over topics to
which women had direct access on the basis of their professional roles. Across all
cases, gender categories were made salient and replaced other identity categories such
as Yankee fan (Extract 1) or political opponent (Extracts 2–6). As a membership
categorisation device “mansplaining” instantiates the “viewers’ maxim” (Sacks,
1992a) by tying participants’ gender categories to their situated conduct: the men
who assume more knowledge than their women interlocutors do that as men rather
than as Republicans, TV hosts, or politicians, which renders their conduct into a
sexist act. Furthermore, in the case of accusations which trade on men’s claims to
gendered knowledge (Extracts 3–4), the participants’ incumbency in gendered cate-
gories is constitutive of the transgression, because the victims, as women, have the
right to claim superior knowledge over issues of reproductive healthcare. We also
highlighted that the women who leveraged the accusations often deployed them in
interjacent overlap (e.g. Extracts 3, 4, 6) which aligns with Kitzinger’s (2007) obser-
vation that women are equally likely to interrupt their male interlocutors. In Extract
6, the accusation of mansplaining is also accompanied by a treatment of the accused’s
turn as interruptive, suggesting that there might still be a “kernel of truth” in the
belief that men tend to interrupt women more often, or, at least, that interruptive talk
can be recognisably tied to male gender identity.
We also sought to ascertain how gender shapes or is shaped by accusations and
whether mansplaining, like other new vocabularies of sexism, fulfils the promise of
empowering women to “unravel and resolve issues of power and historical
obstacles of inequality” (Bridges, 2017, p. 98). Our findings suggest that women
can use “mansplaining” to speak up against hitherto “unspeakable” inequalities.
Unlike accusations of being patronising, mansplaining neatly packages gender
relations within the term itself, thus magnifying the transgressor’s culpability. In
these senses, “mansplaining” can empower women to “resist linguistic repressions”
(Bridges, 2017, p. 97) as it strikes directly at both the gender inequality and inter-
actional trouble caused by an interlocutor. However, we also discovered that the
conversational mechanics that underpin accusations of mansplaining can be
exploited to undermine interlocutors even if they had not transgressed (Extract
6). This goes to show that, like other action descriptions (Sidnell, 2017), formula-
tions of mansplaining can be deployed to further the accuser’s agenda without
necessarily providing a truthful characterisation of her interlocutor’s action.
The examined accusations come from eight different settings and a variety of
multi-party activities such as panel discussions, parliamentary debates, and inter-
views, which increases the applicability of our findings. However, readers may
wonder about the extent to which our findings are generalisable beyond the exam-
ined settings. Conversation analytic methodology posits that the building blocks of
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conversation are both context-specific, in that they are deployed to fit with local
interactional circumstances, and context-independent, in that they function com-
parably across different contexts. Our analysis identified a series of methods people
use to formulate accusations of mansplaining and, insofar as these methods draw
on fundamental conversational practices and resources, such as gender categories
and epistemic rights (Zimmerman & Boden, 1991), we are motivated to believe
they are widely available to conversationalists.
Readers may wonder whether our collection of 16 cases exhausts the methods
participants have to produce accusations of mansplaining. As conversation analysts,
we do not use numeric criteria to evaluate the span and completeness of our analysis,
which is geared towards providing a meticulous, in-depth characterisation of indi-
vidual episodes of social interaction. Furthermore, the practices we describe in this
paper are robust, recurrent, and exhaust all cases in our collection. However, know-
ing that language exhibits immense flexibility (Sacks et al., 1974), we do not rule out
the possibility that other uses of mansplaining may exist or will develop over time.
In sum, our analysis has shown that spontaneous accusations of mansplaining
index an epistemic injustice and hold the accused responsible for that imbalance.
Moreover, by building gender into these accusations as the ostensible motive
behind the transgression, the culpability of the conduct is compounded by
sexism. Mansplaining, unlike accusations of being patronising or condescending,
package a sanctionable action with an ostensible motive and thus make visible
sexism as deliberate conduct.
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Notes
1. To add to the clarity of the analysis: Dave (DP), Kevin (KC), Dan (DK), Frankie (FB),
Jared (JD), Eric (EH), and Tommy (TS) are all men, and Liz (LG) is a woman. For all
extracts we ascribe gender identities to participants based on how they themselves and
their interlocutors present their gender identity in the interaction.
2. Still image from: https://www.barstoolsports.com/boston/barstool-rundown-october-10-
2018?_branch_match_id=449993024930181382. Available under the Fair Dealings pro-
vision (UK) for non-commercial research.
3. Monica Klein (MK) is a woman and Tucker Carlson (TC) is a man.
4. Noah Rothman (NR) and Richard Lui (RL) are men and Danielle Moodie-Mills (DM),
Zerlina Maxwell (ZM), and Elie Mystal (not featured in the extract) are women.
5. Still image from: https://www.mediaite.com/tv/conservative-columnist-noah-rothman-
accused-of-mansplaining-roe-v-wade-on-msnbc-dont-ever-do-that/. Available under the
Fair Dealings provision (UK) for non-commercial research.
6. Kate O’Connell (KO) is a woman and Peadar Toibın is a man. The gender identity of the
Chair is unclear from the interaction.
7. Andrea Leadsom (AL) is a woman and Chris Leslie (CL) is a man.
8. Claire Perry (CP) and the host, Jo Coburn (JC) are women and Barry Gardiner (BG)
is a man.
9. Still image from: https://learningonscreen.ac.uk/ondemand/index.php/prog/122636FE?
bcast=127695123. Available under the Fair Dealings provision (UK) for non-
commercial research.
References
Bates, L. (2016, September 13). Mansplaining: how not to talk to female NASA astronauts.
The Guardian. https://www.theguardian.com/lifeandstyle/womens-blog/2016/sep/13/man
splaining-how-not-talk-female-nasa-astronauts
Bridges, J. (2017). Gendering metapragmatics in online discourse: “Mansplaining man
gonna mansplain. . .”. Discourse, Context & Media, 20, 94–102. https://doi.org/10.1016/
J.DCM.2017.09.010
British Psychological Society. (2014). Code of human research ethics. British Psychological
Society.
British Psychological Society. (2017). Ethics guidelines for internet-mediated research. British
Psychological Society.
Bull, P., & Wells, P. (2012). Adversarial discourse in Prime Minister’s questions. Journal of
Language and Social Psychology, 31(1), 30–48. https://doi.org/10.1177/0261927X11425034
Calder-Dawe, O. (2015). The choreography of everyday sexism: Reworking sexism in inter-
action. New Formations, 86(86), 89–105. https://doi.org/10.3898/NEWF.86.05.2015
Chowdhury, N., & Gibson, K. (2019). This is (still) a man’s world: Young professional
women’s identity struggles in gendered workplaces. Feminism & Psychology, 29(4),
475–93. https://doi.org/10.1177/0959353519850851
DeFrancisco, V. L. (1991). The sounds of silence: How men silence women in marital rela-
tions. Discourse & Society, 2(4), 413–23. https://doi.org/10.1177/0957926591002004003
Demasi, M. A., & Tileaga, C. (2019). Rhetoric of derisive laughter in political debates on the
EU.Qualitative Psychology. Advance online publication. https://doi.org/10.1037/qup0000156
Joyce et al. 23
Drew, P. (1998). Complaints about transgressions and misconduct. Research on Language &
Social Interaction, 31(3–4), 295–325. https://doi.org/10.1080/08351813.1998.9683595
Edelsky, C. (1981). Who’s got the floor? Language in Society, 10, 383–421. https://doi.org/
10.1017/S004740450000885X
Heinemann, T. (2008). Questions of accountability: Yes—no interrogatives that are unan-
swerable. Discourse Studies, 10(1), 55–71. https://doi.org/10.1177/1461445607085590
Hepburn, A., & Bolden, G. (2017). Transcribing for social research. SAGE.
Heritage, J. (1985). Analyzing news interviews: Aspects of the production of talk for an
overhearing audience. In T. A. van Dijk (Ed.),Handbook of discourse analysis, Vol. 3 (pp.
95–117). Academic Press.
Heritage, J. (1998). Oh-prefaced responses to inquiry. Language in Society, 27(3), 291–334.
https://doi.org/10.1017/S0047404598003017
Heritage, J. (2012). Epistemics in action: action formation and territories of knowledge.
Research on Language & Social Interaction, 45(1), 1–29. https://doi.org/10.1080/
08351813.2012.646684
Heritage, J., & Raymond, G. (2005). The terms of agreement: Indexing epistemic authority
and subordination in talk-in-interaction. Social Psychology Quarterly, 68(1), 15–38.
https://doi.org/10.1177/019027250506800103
Hester, S., & Eglin, P. (1997). Culture in action: Studies in membership categorization anal-
ysis. University Press of America.
Housley, W., & Fitzgerald, R. (2015). Introduction to membership categorisation analysis.
In R. Fitzgerald &W. Housley (Eds.) Advances in membership categorisation analysis (pp.
4–5). SAGE.
Jane, E. A. (2017). “Dude . . . stop the spread”: Antagonism, agonism, and #manspreading
on social media. International Journal of Cultural Studies, 20(5), 459–75. https://doi.org/
10.1177/1367877916637151
Jashik, S. (2012, October 16). Calling out academic “mansplaining”. Inside Higher Ed.
https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2012/10/16/new-websiteprovides-%0Aoutlet-vic
tims-academic-mansplaining
Jefferson, G. (1986). Notes on “latency” in overlap onset. Human Studies, 9, 153–183.
https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00148125
Kitzinger, C. (1994). Should psychologists study sex differences? Feminism & Psychology, 4
(4), 501–6. https://doi.org/10.1177/0959353594044003
Kitzinger, C. (2007). Conversation analysis: technical matters for gender research. In K.
Harrington, L. Litosseliti, H. Sauntson, & J. Sunderland (Eds.), Gender and language
research methodologies (pp. 119–38). Palgrave.
Kitzinger, C., & Mandelbaum, J. (2013). Word selection and social identities in talk-in-
interaction. Communication Monographs, 80(2), 176–98. https://doi.org/10.1080/
03637751.2013.776171
Komarovsky, M. (1973). Cultural contradictions and sex roles: The masculine case.
American Journal of Sociology, 78(4), 873–84.
Lakoff, R. (1975). Language and woman’s place. Harper and Row.
Potter, J. (1996). Representing reality: Discourse, rhetoric and social construction. SAGE.
Reagle, J. (2016). The obligation to know: From FAQ to Feminism 101. New Media &
Society, 18(5), 691–707. https://doi.org/10.1177/1461444814545840
24 Feminism & Psychology 0(0)
Robinson, J., & Kevoe-Feldman, H. (2010). Using full repeats to initiate repair on others’
questions. Research on Language and Social Interaction, 43(3), 232–59. https://doi.org/10.
1080/08351813.2010.497990
Romaniuk, T. (2015). Talking about sexism. Journal of Language and Social Psychology,
34(4), 446–63. https://doi.org/10.1177/0261927X15586794
Sacks, H. (1989). Lecture six : The M. I. R. membership categorization device. Human
Studies, 12(3/4), 271–81. http://www.jstor.org/stable/20009063
Sacks, H. (1992a). Lectures on conversation, Volume 1. Blackwell.
Sacks, H. (1992b). Lectures on conversation, Volume 2. Blackwell.
Sacks, H., Schegloff, E. A., & Jefferson, G. (1974). A simplest systematics for the organi-
sation of turn-taking for conversation. Language, 50(4), 696–735. https://doi.org/10.
2307/412243
Schegloff, E. A. (2000). Overlapping talk and the organization of turn-taking for conver-
sation. Language in Society, 29(01), 1–63. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0047404500001019
Shaw, C., & Hepburn, A. (2013). Managing the moral implications of advice in informal
interaction. Research on Language & Social Interaction, 46(4), 344–62. https://doi.org/10.
1080/08351813.2013.839095
Sidnell, J. (2017). Action in interaction is conduct under a description. Language in Society,
46(3), 313–37. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0047404517000173
Sidnell, J., & Stivers, T. (Eds.). (2013). The handbook of conversation analysis. Wiley-
Blackwell.
Solnit, R. (2008, April 13). Men explain things to me (Facts didn’t get in their way). Los
Angeles Times. https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-2008-apr-13-op-solnit13-story.
html
Solnit, R. (2012, August 20).Men explain things to me. Guernica. https://www.guernicamag.
com/rebecca-solnit-men-explain-things-to-me/
Sorrentino, J., Augoustinos, M., & Le Couteur, A. (2018). “[It] does not explain every-
thing . . . , nor does it explain nothing . . . it explains some things”: Australia’s first female
Prime Minister and the dilemma of gender. Feminism & Psychology, 29(1), 19–39. https://
doi.org/10.1177/0959353518790595
Speer, S. A. (2002). Sexist talk: Gender categories, participants’ orientations and irony.
Journal of Sociolinguistics, 6(3), 347–77. https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-9481.00192
Stivers, T., & Hayashi, M. (2010). Transformative answers: One way to resist a question’s
constraints. Language in Society, 39(1). https://doi.org/10.1017/S0047404509990637
Stivers, T., Mondada, L., & Steensig, J. (2011). The morality of knowledge in conversation.
Cambridge University Press.
Stokoe, E. (2003). Mothers, single women and sluts: Gender, morality and membership
categorization in neighbour disputes. Feminism & Psychology, 13(3), 107–29.
Tannen, D. (1994). Talking from 9 to 5: How women’s and men’s conversational styles affect
who gets heard, who gets credit, and what gets done at work. William Morrow and
Company.
Terasaki, A. K. (2004). Pre-announcement sequences in conversation. In G. H. Lerner (Ed.),
Conversation analysis: Studies from the first generation (pp. 171–223). John Benjamins
Publishing Company.
Weatherall, A. (2002). Gender, language and discourse. Routledge.
Joyce et al. 25
Weatherall, A. (2015). Sexism in language and talk-in-interaction. Journal of Language and
Social Psychology, 34(4), 410–26. https://doi.org/10.1177/0261927X15586574
Weatherall, A., & Edmonds, D. M. (2018). Speakers formulating their talk as interruptive.
Journal of Pragmatics, 123, 11–23. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.pragma.2017.11.008
Whitehead, K. A., & Stokoe, E. (2015). Producing and responding to -isms in interaction.
Journal of Language and Social Psychology, 34(4), 368–73. https://doi.org/10.1177/
0261927X15586432
Wilhelm, H. (2017, December). Mansplaining and the gender wars. Commentary. https://
www.commentarymagazine.com/articles/mansplaining-gender-wars/
Wilkinson, S., & Kitzinger, C. (2008). Using conversation analysis in feminist and critical
research. Social and Personality Psychology Compass, 2(2), 555–73.
Wowk, M. T. (1984). Blame allocation, sex and gender in a murder interrogation. Women’s
Studies International Forum, 7(1), 75–82. https://doi.org/10.1016/0277-5395(84)90087-6
Zimmerman, D. H. (1998). Identity, context and interaction. In C. Antaki & S. Widdicombe
(Eds.), Identities in talk (pp. 87–106). SAGE.
Zimmerman, D. H., & Boden, D. (1991). Structure-in-action: An introduction. In D. H.
Zimmerman & D. Boden (Eds.), Talk and social structures: Studies in ethnomethodology
and conversation analysis (pp. 3–21). Polity Press.
Zimmerman, D. H., & West, C. (1975). Sex roles, interruptions and silences in conversation.
In B. Thorne & N. Henley (Eds.), Language and sex: Difference and dominance (pp.
105–29). Newbury House.
Author Biographies
Jack B. Joyce is a Postdoctoral Research Associate in the School of
Communication and Media at Ulster University. He is currently working on the
Real Complaints project which is enhancing the NHS complaints journey. He
completed his PhD on the sequential and moral (dis)order of public disputes in
the School of Social Sciences and Humanities at Loughborough University. Dr.
Joyce’s background is in linguistics, sociology, and communication and his
research uses ethnomethodological approaches (conversation analysis, member-
ship categorisation analysis, discursive psychology) to investigate disputes, resis-
tance, and smart communication.
Bogdana Huma is a Lecturer in Social Psychology at York St John University. Her
research uses conversation analysis and discursive psychology to study social psy-
chological topics “in the wild”.
Hanna-Leena Ristim€aki (M.Soc.Sci) is a Doctoral Researcher of Social Psychology
in the Faculty of Social Sciences (SOC) at Tampere University, Finland. Her
research uses conversation analysis and membership categorisation analysis and
her interests are institutional and embodied interaction, multi-party decision-
26 Feminism & Psychology 0(0)
making and asylum processes. Ristim€aki’s doctoral thesis is a part of the research
project “Joint negotiation on employee’s return to work solutions”, coordinated by
Tampere University and the Finnish Institution of Occupational Health.
Fabio Ferraz de Almeida is a Postdoctoral Researcher in the Department of
Language and Communication Studies at the University of Jyv€askyl€a, currently
working on the project “Negotiating international criminal law: A courtroom
ethnography of trial performance at the International Criminal Court”, funded
by the Academy of Finland. He completed his PhD on police investigative inter-
views at Loughborough University. In his research, he draws upon conversation
analysis and ethnomethodology to study talk-in-interaction in institutional set-
tings, particularly in police and judicial contexts.
Ann Doehring received a PhD in social psychology in 2019 from Loughborough
University. Her doctoral research used conversation analysis to examine three-
party interactions between doctors, patients and their companions in a UK seizure
clinic. Since then she has been a Research Associate in the Department of
Communication and Media at Loughborough University, looking at how pallia-
tive healthcare practitioners manage disagreements between patients and compan-
ions about healthcare options. She is interested in how people use language to
navigate difficult and delicate conversations, and how people negotiate their roles
and participation in an interaction.
Joyce et al. 27
Appendix 1
Table 3. URLs for the data extracts and their respective last access date





MNSP_02 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=t6pNxshjQMQ&t November 2018
MNSP_03 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lY5sm7sgimg October 2018
MNSP_04 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7TOHSo03Nvo August 2018


















MNSP_13 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8AtOw-xyMo8 November 2018
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